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Abstract
Technical progress lowers costs and prices but appears to have an
ambiguous effect on product reliabilty. This paper presents a simple
model which explains this observation.
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1 Introduction
It is a commonplace observation that technical progress over time lowers
production costs and prices, but the effect of technical progress on product1
reliabilty is more ambiguous. Cars are more reliable now than they were fifty
years ago, but trains are not necessarily more punctual. Silicon chips (for
example memory chips used in personal computers) are cheaper (adjusting for
improved performance) than they were ten years ago, but fail relibility checks
at about the same rate (see Pecht, Radjojcic and Rao[1] for a discussion of
1Throughout the paper the term "product" will mean "product or service".
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chip reliabilty). Technical progress has presumably improved production
and quality control processes, so these observations are surprising. Figure 1
shows warranty data for Hewlett Packard between 2003 qnd 2010. Quarterly
claims, the accrual rate and the claims rate can all be thought of as proxies
for product reliability. Taking the three measure together there is no clear
trend of reliability over time.
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Fig 1. Reliability proxies for Hewlett Packard 2003 - 2010
Figure 2 shows reliabilty proxies (warranty accruals as a percentage of au-
tomotive revenue) for six car manafacturers between 2003 an 2011. Again
there is no discernible trend over time.
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Fig 2. Reliabilty proxies for six car manafacturers, 2003 - 2011
This paper develops a simple model of product reliability which provides a
possible expalnation for these "stylised facts". The paper draws a sharp dis-
tinction between quality and reliability. It defines the latter as the objective
probability (frequency) of output failure, a probability which the firm can
choose, for example via the quality control process, the choice of technique
or the design of output. The paper argues that this approach comes closer to
describing the process by which reliability is actually determined than does
the conventional output quality approach, which is more relevant to aspects
of production other than reliability. For example, the conventional analysis
explains well why some computers have fast processors or large hard drives,
but not why they break down so often.
3
2 Modelling Reliability
In the model presented here “reliability” will be defined as “the probability
of an event disliked by consumers not occurring”. Examples of such an event
are:
A: A consumer durable (e.g. computers, cars, washing machines, televi-
sions etc.) breaking down within some given time period.
B: An intermediate good such as a silicon chip (or other component)
failing to function correctly (here the “consumer” is another firm).
C: A train or plane not arriving within some predetermined time period
of its scheduled arrival time.
D: Electricity, gas, or water supplies or telephone services being inter-
rupted for more than some predetermined period. Note that commercial
contracts for these services may allow some interruption of service without
penalty (e.g. the commercial supply of gas). Matsukawa and Fujii (1994)[2]
study Japanese electricity consumers and show, among other things, that
they face a trade-off between price and reliability of electricity supply.
The probability referred to here is an objective frequency. For example, if
a computer manufacturer produces 100,000 computers each year and 93,000
do not break down within a given time period (say one year) the reliability of
these computers is 0.93. It will be assumed that the firm chooses reliability
(as defined here), for example via output design, choice of technique and
quality control procedures. Thus the computer firm knows for sure that
7,000 of its computers will break down within the year, but it neither knows
nor cares which 7,000 they will be. Now suppose the firm offers a one-
year warranty with its computers, promising compensation in the event of a
breakdown. In this model the firm faces no uncertainty concerning its profits:
it knows its revenue and production costs, it knows that there will be 7,000
claims under the warranty (though not which customers will make them)
and it knows how much it will have to pay out per claim (that can either
be treated as endogenous or imposed by a regulator). There is therefore no
uncertainty about its profits.
It will be assumed that consumers (who, in the case of intermediate goods
mentioned in point B above, will be other firms) have no knowledge about
individual products or services but do know the reliability of each firm’s
output (in the sense defined here). Consumers read Which? magazine or
Consumer Reports or obtain information on reliability from other sources.
For example in the UK, the Strategic Rail Authority publishes information
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on the average punctuality of the different rail operators.
Supplying firms will be assumed to have the same information. This is
a plausible assumption because it is usually impossible or extremely costly
for firms to obtain information on each example of its output before it is
sold. Firms will be assumed to vary reliability (as defined here), for example
via product design, choice of technique and quality control procedures. It
will be assumed that higher reliability entails higher production costs. Thus,
the computer manufacturer will be able to reduce (or increase) the number
of breakdowns in a given time period without knowing (or caring) which
computers will break down and which will not. It will therefore be assumed
to know the reliability of its output (as defined here), without knowing which
examples of its output will break down.
In this model the firm faces no uncertainty, though this is not true of
consumers, who are assumed to be risk averse. This assumption is readily
justified, for example, in the consumer durables market, where each consumer
typically owns one example of the good and is thus extremely concerned at
the prospect of its breaking down. The firm, by contrast, supplies many ex-
amples of the good, and may well find it profitable to operate a risk-pooling
warranty scheme. Under these assumptions there arises a demand, on the
part of consumers, for insurance. This might, as mentioned above, be pro-
vided in the form of a product warranty offered by the firm, or an insurance
policy provided jointly with the product. In the case of intermediate goods,
“warranties” may be thought of as compensation clauses built into standard
supply contracts. A similar interpretation applies to services such as elec-
tricity and gas. In the case of transport services, it is clearly possible for
suppliers to offer compensation to dissatisfied passengers. Throughout the
paper attention will be confined to voluntarily offered warranties or com-
pensation, though the model is readily modified to include legally compelled
compensation. It could also be modified to cover more than one undesired
event (e.g. different degrees of product breakdown), or to cover product
hazard and safety issues. Warranties, whether voluntary or legally com-
pelled, have an important bearing on decisions affecting reliability because
the higher the reliability of a firm’s marketed output, the lower the warranty
costs experienced by the firm (ceteris paribus). In the model developed in
this paper, warranties play the role of allocating risk, and providing an incen-
tive to supply reliable output, in contrast to much of the existing literature
on warranties, where they have a signalling role.
As noted in section 1, the model developed in this paper differs sharply
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from that presented in the literature on product quality. That literature
deals either with search goods or with experience goods. In the former case
both supplier and consumer know all relevant characteristics of each good
or service before sale takes place (e.g. the computer has a 5.0GHz processor
and an 500Gb hard drive, the train has a good restaurant etc.). See for
example Mussa and Rosen (1978)[3], and Matthews and Moore (1987)[4] for
models of this type. In the case of experience goods, there is an asymmetry
of information. “Nature” dictates all relevant characteristics of each good or
service to the supplier before sale, but these are unknown to the consumer
at that stage. (E.g. the computer’s hard drive will fail in the first year, the
train will be 2 hours late). The supplier’s problem is thus one of signalling.
Perhaps by means of advertising, or offering a warranty or compensation
deal, the supplier of high quality output seeks to signal his high quality to
consumers in a credible way. See, for example, Grossman (1981)[5], Milgrom
and Roberts (1982, 1986)[6][7], Kreps and Wilson (1982)[8], Klein and Lef-
fler (1981)[9], Shapiro (1983)[10], and McClure and Spector (1991)[11] for
models of this type. Neither of these approaches is of much use in analysing
reliability. Search good models assume too much information on both sides
of the market, while experience good models assume too much information
on the supply side and not enough on the demand side. Moreover, the latter
kind of model is based on an exogenously given quality level, while reliability
(as defined in this paper) will be determined endogenously by the supplier’s
decisions, as discussed above.
A standard problem, often assumed away in the literature, is that of moral
hazard on the part of consumers. If consumers can themselves influence the
probability or size of a claim under the warranty, for example by failing
to take proper care of the good during consumption, then the economic
role of warranties may be reduced. See, for example McKean (1970)[12],
Oi (1973)[13], Priest (1981)[14] and Goering (1997)[15], who discusses the
problem of moral hazard facing a durable goods monopolist. For simplicity
moral hazard will be assumed away in this paper. It should be noted that
the model presented here focuses on reliability and warranties, deliberately
suppressing some other aspects of the markets discussed above. For example,
it is essentially a static model, and is not intended to deal with the issue of
dynamic consistency in durable goods markets. Moreover, it is a model of
symmetric information. In such a model nothing can be gained by admitting
the possibility of repeat purchasing, since neither side of the market can learn
anything useful about the other.
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3 The Demand Side
In the model of this paper, consumers’ preferences have three distinct aspects.
• The consumer’s preference for the good in its un-broken-down state.
This varies across consumers and is exogenous.
• The consumer’s degree of risk aversion. For convenience this is
assumed constant across consumers and is exogenous.
• The probability of the good not breaking down within some given
time period (i.e. the reliability of the good). Subjective and objective prob-
abilities are, by definition, identical in this model. It is an essential feature
of the model that this probability is endogenous (determined by firms’ deci-
sions) and the same for all consumers.
The details of consumers’ utility functions are developed below.
The demand side of the market will be assumed to consist of z consumers,
each consuming a single unit of the output. Each consumer has a different
reservation price, and hence the market demand curve is downward sloping.
For simplicity we take z to be a strictly positive real variable. Each consumer
has a money budget M available and pays a price p for the output. As dis-
cussed in section 2, two states of the world are assumed: either the undesired
event occurs or it does not. In the latter case the z’th consumer receives a
stream of services which she values at f(z) (perhaps generated by a durable
good). Note that z > 0 and f ′(z) < 0. In the former case the consumer val-
ues the stream of services at zero, but the firm makes a voluntary warranty
(or compensation) payment of β to her. Costs of writing and enforcing the
warranty (or compensation) contract are ignored. Thus the z’th consumer
receives income stream:
x =M − p+ f(z) (1)
if the undesired event does not occur and:
y =M − p+ β (2)
if it does.
The reliability of a product will be defined as in section 2, as the objective
probability (R) of the undesired event not occurring. Consumers are assumed
to be risk-averse maximisers of expected utility. As discussed in section 2, it
will be assumed that consumers are fully informed about reliability (R), so
that the subjective probability of the undesired event not occurring is equal
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to the objective probability (R). Of course R is determined endogenously by
the management decisions of the firm.
The z’th consumer maximises expected utility:
V = RU(M − p+ f(z)) + (1−R)U(M − p− β) (3)
Clearly U ′(.) > 0, and, to ensure risk aversion, it is assumed that U ′′(.) <
0 (i.e. the function U(.) is assumed strictly concave).
Note that the z’th consumer is indifferent between consuming and not
consuming when:
V = RU(M − p+ f(z)) + (1−R)U(M − p− β) = U(M) (4)
since U(M) is the expected utility she would get by not consuming the
output (she will be referred to as the “marginal consumer”). Equation (4)
generates, for given values of R and β, a relationship between p and z, namely
the market demand curve. Each consumer has a different reservation price,
and thus the market demand curve slopes downwards (see figure 1). Note
that R and β are determined by the decisions of the firm, so that consumers
can be thought of as consuming a “bundle” consisting of a stream of services
(perhaps provided by a durable good), its reliability and the warranty deal.
They are not able to “unbundle” these three things. If the firm raises R or β
the demand curve will shift upwards, except that, when a full “money back”
warranty is offered (β = p), the marginal consumer will be indifferent as to
whether the undesired event occurs or not (since x = y when β = p). In
this case, as R changes, the demand curve will rotate about the equilibrium,
which will itself be immune to variations in R. Note also that the f(z)
curve must be steeper than the demand curve (see figure 3) because it is the
relationship between p and z which would hold if β were continually kept
equal to p (this is clear from equation (4)). Accordingly the function p = f(z)
will be referred to as the pseudo-demand curve. Of course the demand curve
proper is defined ceteris paribus (i.e. holding everything constant except p
and z).
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Fig 3. The distribution of tastes (or pseudo-demand curve) f(z) and the
market demand curve F (z : R, β)
4 The Supply Side
Firms’ costs will depend on the reliability of their output for a number of
different reasons.
1. Reliability can be designed into the output. Higher reliability designs
will, in general, be more costly to produce than lower reliability ones.
2. Techniques of production can be adopted which generate higher relia-
bility. Techniques generating higher reliability output will, in general,
be more costly to operate than those generating lower reliability output.
3. The stringency of quality control can be varied. Stricter quality control
will, in general, raise reliability, but will also raise scrap or rework costs.
4. Higher reliability will reduce the number of claims under the warranty
and hence, for a given warranty payment, reduce warranty costs.
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It is to be expected that technical progress would affect product design,
production techniques and the costs of quality control, having an overall
effect of reducing costs at any given level of reliabilty. This is captured in
the cost function specified below.
The model developed here formalises the firm’s costs by assuming that
production costs are increasing in the reliability (R) of output, and by incor-
porating warranty costs into the firm’s profit-maximising decision. Average
and marginal production costs, at a given reliability level and state of tech-
nology, will be assumed constant. Note that z is the firm’s output and t
the state of technology. Adopting the assumptions set out above a suitable
production cost function is:
zC(R, t) (5)
where CR(R, t) > 0, Ct(R, t) < 0 and CRR(R, t) > 0 for 0 < R < 1. The
C(R) function is depicted in figure 4.
 
C(R,t) 
1         R 
Fig 4. The cost of reliability function C(R, t)
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The number of times that the undesired event occurs is clearly z(1−R),
and thus warranty or compensation costs are given by:
βz(1−R) (6)
Thus the firm maximises the profit function:
π = pz − zC(R)− βz(1−R) (7)
5 Competitive Equilibrium
As discussed in section 4 above, average and marginal costs (at given lev-
els of R an β) are assumed constant. The number of firms in competitve
equilibrium is therefore left undetermined and maximising industry profits is
equivalent to maximising firm profits. Free entry (or Bertrand competiton)
will ensure that equilibrium profits are zero. There are no non-convexities,
externalities or public goods in the model, and a competitive equilibrium is
therefore Pareto-efficient. Formally, a competitive equilibrium is a 4-tuple
(p, z, R, β) with the following two defining characteristcs:
1. Each consumer’s expected utilty is maximised subject to the constraint
that industry profits are non-negative (this constraint will turn out to
be binding).
2. The 4-tuple (p, z, R, β) satisfies equation (4) (the market demand curve).
To characterise a competive equilibrium we take a Lagrange multiplier λ
for the profit constraint and form the Lagrangian:
L = RU(x) + (1−R)U(y) + λ[pz − zC(R, t)− βz(1−R)] (8)
We now derive first-order conditions for an interior solution of this prob-
lem. First note the definitions of equations (1) and (2) (x = M − p + f(z)
and y =M − p+ β).
Proposition 1 In competitive equilibrium the zero profit constraint is bind-
ing.
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Proof. Differentiating first with respect to p:
−RU ′(x)− (1−R)U ′(y) + λz = 0⇒ λz = RU ′(x) + (1−R)U ′(y) > 0 (9)
But z > 0,hence λ > 0 and it follows by complementary slackness that the
zero profit constraint is binding.
We now establish that, in competitive equilibrium, a full "money back"
warranty is offered. Thus risk neutral firms fully insure risk-averse consumers
and the allocation of risk is efficient.
Proposition 2 In competitive equilibrium f(z) = p = β = CR(R, t) and
thus a full "money back" warranty is offered.
Proof. First differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to β:
Lβ = (1−R)U
′(y)− λz(1−R) = 0 (10)
Equations (9) and (10) together yield: (1−R)U ′(y) = (1−R)(RU ′(x)+(1−
R)U ′(y) ⇒ U ′(y) = RU ′(x) + (1 − R)U ′(y) ⇒ RU ′(y) = RU ′(x) ⇒ x = y
(R = 1 and R = 0 because we are seeking an interior solution: U ′(.) is
invertible because U ′′(.) < 0). Hence, given the definitions of x and y, we
have:
β = f(z) (11)
in competitive equilibrium. Now differentiate the Lagrangian with respect
to R:
LR = U(x)− U(y) + λ(−zCR(R, t) + βz) = 0 (12)
But, in competitive equilibrium, x = y, and z > 0, because we are seeking
an interior solution. Hence equation (12) yields:
β = CR(R, t) (13)
Now note that a competitive equilibrium must satisfy the market demand
curve (equation (4)). But we have x = y in competitive equilibrium so
equation (XX) yields: RU(x) + (1 − R)U(x) = U(M) ⇒ U(x) = U(M) ⇒
x = M (noting that U ′(.) is invertible because U ′′(.) < 0). Hence, from the
definition of x we have:
p = f(z) (14)
in competitive equilibrium. Now combining equations (11), (13) and (14) it
is straightforward to establish that in competitive equilibrium:
f(z) = p = β = CR(R, t) (15)
and thus that a full "money back" warranty is offered.
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6 The effects of technical progress
Technical progress is modelled as an increase in t, given the properties of the
cost of reliabilty function C(R, t) assumed in section X above, namely:
1. CR(R, t) > 0 (for 0 < R < 1)
2. Ct(R, t) < 0 (for 0 < R < 1)
3. CRR(R, t) > 0 (for 0 < R < 1)
We first establish an expression for
dR
dt
.
Proposition 3
dR
dt
=
Ct(R, t)−RCRt(R, t)
RCRR(R, t)
Proof. From Proposition 1, the zero profit condition is binding in com-
petitive equilibrium. We therefore have: pz = zC(R, t) + βz(1 − R) ⇒
p = C(R, t) + β(1 − R) ⇒ C(R, t) = βR = CR(R, t)R (from equation
15). Differentiating totally with respect to t yields: CR(R, t)
dR
dt
+Ct(R, t) =
R
[
CRR
dR
dt
+ CRt(R, t)
]
+CR(R, t)
dR
dt
. Hence: Ct(R, t) = RCRR
dR
dt
+RCR(R, t).
Re-arranging yields the required result.
Given Proposition 3 and properties 1 - 3 above, it is clear that the sign
of
dR
dt
depends on the sign of Ct(R, t)−RCRt(R, t). In particular:
Ct(R, t)−RCRt(R, t) > 0⇒
dR
dt
> 0 and Ct(R, t)−RCRt(R, t) < 0⇒
dR
dt
< 0
(16)
We now adopt a particular form for the cost of reliability function:
C(R, t) = e−tD(R) (17)
Where D(R) > 0, D′(R) > 0 and D′′(R) > 0. Hence:
CR(R, t) = e
−tD′(R) > 0; Ct(R, t) = −e
−tD(R) = −C(R, t) < 0(18)
CRR(R, t) = e
−tD′′(R) > 0; CRt(R, t) = −e
−tD′(R) < 0 (19)
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and conditions 1, 2 and 3 above are satisfied. The conditions of (16) can now
be written as:
D(R) < RD′(R)⇒
dR
dt
> 0; D(R) > RD′(R)⇒
dR
dt
< 0 (20)
Interpreting t as time, it is now possible to analyse the behaviour of
reliability over time for different D(R) functions.
Example 1. Let D(R) = aR2 + b where a > b > 0. Then RD′(R) =
2aR2. The functions D(R) and RD′(R) are shown in figure 5 together with
the resulting dynamics of R (derived from the conditions of (20). In this case
there is a knife-edge level R∗ of reliabilty. If R is initially above R∗ =
√
b
a
technical progress will always raise reliability but if R is initially below R∗
technical progress will always lower reliability.
 
a
bR =*  
R  1 
)(RD  
)(' RRD  
0>
dt
dR
 0<
dt
dR
 
Fig 5. The dynamics of R for the function D(R) = aR2 + b where a > b > 0
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Example 2. Now consider the same D(R) function as in Example 1,
but take b > a > 0. The functions D(R) and RD′(R) are shown in figure
6 together with the resulting dynamics of R (derived from the conditions of
(20). In this case technical progress will always lower reliability. D(R) =
aR2 + b where a > b > 0.
 
R  1 
)(RD  
)(' RRD  
0<
dt
dR
 
Fig 6. The dynamics of R for the function D(R) = aR2 + b where b > a > 0
Example 3. Now let D(R) = R(1−R)−1. In this case products of zero
reliability cost nothing to produce, while perfect reliability (R = 1) attracts
infinite cost. Then RD′(R) = R(1−R)−1+R2(1−R)−2 = D(R)+[D(R)]2 >
D(R) for 0 < R < 1. The functions D(R) and RD′(R) are shown in figure
7 together with the resulting dynamics of R (derived from the conditions of
(20). In this case technical progress will always raise reliability.
15
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Fig 7. The dynamics of R for the function D(R) = R(1−R)−1
7 Monopoly Equilibrium
In monopoly equilibrium there is a single supplier, maximising his profits,
subject to the voluntary participation constraint. This is the constraint that
each consumer obtains at least as much expected utility from purchasing the
output as from not doing so. Mathematically it is simply:
RU(M − p+ f(z)) + (1−R)U(M − p− β) ≥ U(M) (21)
In monopoly equilibrium z is determined at a level which makes this
constraint bind (i.e. the z’th. consumer is the marginal consumer, who
is just on the point of leaving the market, and z is the monopolist’s total
output). Amonopoly equilibrium is easily characterised by taking a Lagrange
multiplier (µ) for the constraint (21) (noting equation (7), which specifies the
monopolist’s profits) and forming the Lagrangian:
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M = pz−zC(R, t)−βz(1−R)+µ(RU(M−p+f(z))+(1−R)U(M−p−β)−U(M))
(22)
Differentiating (22) yields first-order conditions for an interior solution.
First, note the definitons of equations (1) and (2) (x = M − p + f(z) and
y =M − p+ β). It is now straightforward to establish:
Proposition 4 In monopoly equilibrium the voluntary participation constraint
binds. That is: U(M) = RU(x) + (1−R)U(y).
Proof. Differentiating first with respect to p:
z + µ(−RU ′(x)− (1−R)U ′(y)) = 0 (23)
It follows that µ = 0, since we seek an interior solution (z > 0). Hence, by
complemenatry slackness, the voluntary participation constraint must bind.
We now establish:
Proposition 5 In monopoly equilibrium f(z) = p = β = CR(R, t) and thus
a full "money back" warranty is offered.
Proof. Differentiating with respect to β yields:
−z(1−R) + µ(1−R)U ′(y) = 0 (24)
Hence z = µU ′(y). So now (23) implies Rµ[U ′(y)− U ′(x)] = 0⇒ x = y ⇒
β = f(z) (25)
But the voluntary participation constraint binds, so U(y) = U(x) = U(M)⇒
x = y =M ⇒
p = β = f(z) (26)
Differentiating now with respect to R yields:
−zCR(R, t) + βz + µ[U(x)− U(y)] = 0 (27)
But we have x = y in monopoly equilibrium, hence:
β = CR(R, t) (28)
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Combining (26) and (28) we have (in monopoly equilibrium):
f(z) = p = β = CR(R, t) (29)
We now establish:
Proposition 6 In monopoly equilibrium:
Rzf ′(z)
p
=
C(R, t)
CR(R, t)
−R (30)
Proof. First differentiate the Lagrangian (22) with respect to z:
p− C(R, t)− β(1−R) + µRU ′(x)f ′(z) = 0 (31)
Hence, using (23) and noting that x = y in monopoly equilibrium„ we have:
p+zRf ′(z) = C(R, t)+β(1−R). Using Proposition 5 we obtain: zRf ′(z) =
C(R, t) − RCR(R, t). Re-arranging, using Proposition 5 again, yields the
required result.
Now note from section 3 that f(z) is the demand curve which would face
the monopolist when he offers a full "money back" warranty (i.e. maintains
β = p), which he will do in equilibrium, as Proposition Y shows. Accordingly
the function f(z)will be referred to as the pseudo demand curve. Thus the
expression:
η =
1
ǫ
=
zf ′(z)
p
(32)
defines the pseudo elasticity of demand ( ǫ). It is the elasticity of demand
which arises when the monopolist continually offers a full "money back"
warranty.
We now establish:
Proposition 7 In monopoly equilibrium:
dR
dt
=
(1 + η)RCR,t(R, t)− Ct(R, t)
ηCR(R, t) + (1 + η)RCRR(R, t)
(33)
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Proof. Write (30) as: Rη =
C(R, t)
CR(R, t)
− R. Re-arranging yields: (1 +
η)RCR(R, t) = C(R, t). Now differentiate totally w.r.t t. This yields:
(1 + η)[R(CRR
dR
dt
+ CRt) + CR
dR
dt
] = CR
dR
dt
+ Ct (34)
Re-arranging (34) yields the required result.
Corollary When the pseudo-elasticity of demand is greater than−1 (i.e.
when the pseudo demand curve is inelastic) it is easy to show that, adopting
the functional form of (17) and the consequent inequalities (18) and (19),
technical progress under monopoly always reduces reliabilty.
Proof. First subsitute the functional form of (17) into (33). this yields:
dR
dt
=
−(1 + η)RD′(R) +D(R)
ηD′(R) + (1 + η)RD′′(R)
(35)
Now simply note that 0 > ǫ > −1 ⇒ (1 + η) < 0 , then inspection of (35)
yields
dR
dt
< 0.
When ǫ < −1 it is necessary to adopt a particular functional form for
D(R). Adopting the functional form of Example 1 yields:
Example 4. LetD(R) = aR2+b where a, b > 0. ThenD′(R) = 2aR and
D′′(R) = 2a. Substituting in (35), it is easy to show that: ǫ > −2⇒
dR
dt
< 0
and ǫ < −2⇒
dR
dt
> 0.
8 Conclusions
Technical progress reduces costs and prices but has an amibiguous effect on
product reliability. The model of this paper treats product reliability as the
objective probabilty (frequency) of "product failure", a probability chosen by
firms under conditions of symmetric but imperfect information. The paper
thus sharply differentiates "reliability" from "quality", usually analysed as a
product characteristic dictated by "Nature" under conditions of asymmetric
information, thereby generating a signalling problem. In the model of this
paper firms supply many examples of their product while consumers demand
just one (or none). In this situation firms (competitive or monopolistic)
naturally supply a "money back" warranty along with the product, thus
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insuring risk-averse consumers. The model permits an analysis of the effects
of technical progress on reliability under competition and monopoly. For
the competitive case three possibilities are illustrated: (1) there exists a
threshold level of reliabilty: if reliability is initially above this level, technical
progress increases it, if reliabilty is initially below this level, technical progress
reduces it: (2) technical progress always increases reliabilty: (3) technical
progress always reduces reliabilty. For the monopolistic case the outcome
depends on the pseudo-elasticity of demand (i.e. the elsaticity which would
arise when the monopolist offers a full money-back warranty, as he would in
equilibrium). When the pseudo-demand curve is inelastic, technical progress
under monopoly always reduces reliabilty. When the pseudo-elasticity of
demand is less than -1 the outcome depends on the form of the cost of
reliability function. In general, the more elastic the pseudo-demand curve,
the more likely is technical progress to increase reliability.
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